Regulation of the gender composition of company boards in Europe: Experience and prospects by Campbell, Kevin & Bohdanowicz, Leszek
Chapter 3 
Regulation of the gender composition of company 
boards in Europe: Experience and prospects 
Kevin Campbell and Leszek Bohdanowicz 
in Women on corporate boards: An international perspective, Aluchna, M and Aras, G (eds), 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, April, pp 50-66. ISBN: 978-1-138-74018-1. 
Introduction 
The desire to increase the share of women on corporate boards in Europe has led to the 
incorporation of voluntary targets into corporate governance codes of best practice in some 
European countries and the introduction of board gender quota laws in others. Taking affirmative 
action by imposing a quota can create a critical mass of women on boards that is sufficient to 
sustain greater numerical equality once the quota is removed (Kogut et al., 2014). A quota law 
for company boards, set at 40% for each gender, was first proposed in Norway in 2002, to the 
surprise of many (Bøhren and Staubo, 2016). At the time women held only 9% of board seats 
(Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Passed by the Norwegian Parliament one year later, the quota became 
mandatory in 2008 and sparked public debate in other countries about the possibility of using 
quotas to increase the representation of women on corporate boards. The European Commission, 
with the support of the European Parliament and a number of Member States, decided in 2012 
that legislative action was necessary to improve gender balance on corporate boards and put 
forward the proposal for a Directive that sets a 40% target for the presence of the under-
represented gender among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges by 
2020. 
In this chapter we evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the enforcement approach 
proposed by the European Commission. Our review draws on evidence about the mandatory quota 
system in Norway. We explore the circumstances in which this kind of approach can have either 
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positive or negative outcomes, as well as the unintended consequences that could follow. We 
explore the different factors that affect the success of quotas, such as the nature of the sanctions 
against non-compliant companies, and their enforcement. The UK has adopted a voluntary 
approach to improving board gender diversity, seeking to increase boardroom gender diversity 
using voluntary targets for listed companies included in the FTSE 100 and 250 indices. We review 
the success of this approach, and related initiatives in other European countries. These contrasting 
approaches (hard versus soft law) raise a crucial question for board diversity: which approach, 
compulsory quotas or a voluntary approach, is the most effective way of improving the 
representation of women in senior roles? 
A catalyst for change: the Norwegian gender quota law 
Nordic countries have long been at the forefront of advancing policies to reduce social inequality, 
with Norway playing a leading role (Borchorst, 2009). Since the early 1970s female participation 
in the Norwegian labour market has been on the increase, in part stimulated by generous welfare 
state provision, and is among the highest in the OECD (Johnsen, 2012). Whether a gender balance 
naturally arises from such a trend is debatable. Karvonen and Selle (1995) suggest that the 
increased integration of women into leadership positions in Nordic society would eventually result 
in gender parity as they become increasingly mobilized and active, but with an uncertain time lag. 
Frustration at the slow pace of change in the private sector eventually led to the enactment of the 
mandatory gender quota law in 2008 and follows on from a tradition of Norwegian state 
involvement in advancing the rights of women (Teige, 2012). Gender quotas have been used by 
Norwegian political parties since the 1970s and they have been applied in the Norwegian public 
sector since the 1980s, with the result that women hold a relatively equal share of management 
positions in publicly owned enterprises (Bolsø and Sørensen, 2013). Despite the high rate of 
working women, and women active in politics and in positions of influence in the Norwegian 
public sector, women in positions of power in private businesses was paradoxically low (Storvik, 
2011). 
By the end of the 1990s it became clear that the private sector was lagging behind the 
public sector and this began to capture political attention. By 2002 less than 10% of the board 
members of the largest listed Norwegian companies were female directors (Eckbo et al., 2016). A 
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review of the Gender Equality Act in 1999 proposed that the gender quota applicable to the public 
sector also be applied to corporate boards. At this stage the argument for this extension was based 
on the principle of gender equality: that women should have equal representation in all positions 
of power and influence, including corporate boards. The proposal was criticized by the corporate 
sector and did not initially cause too much concern. However, this all changed in 2002 when the 
conservative politician and Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar Gabrielsen, announced that he 
wanted to impose a 40% quota on the boards of directors of Norway’s listed firms. The language 
used by Gabrielsen was controversial, reflected in the headline in Norway’s largest newspaper, 
Verdens Gang: “The Minister of Trade and Industry is Sick and Tired of the Men’s Club: Wants 
to Force Women into Boardrooms”. Gabrielsen argued that the low representation of females on 
corporate boards stemmed from ingrained cultural attitudes and that a quota was the only way to 
prevent discrimination against women (Nygaard, 2011; Strøm, 2015).  
The proposal led to a wide-ranging debate in Norway, with most business executives 
opposed to the proposed legislation on the grounds that it was punitive and restricted their freedom 
to conduct business as they saw fit  (Fouche and Treanor, 2006). Arguments were also advanced 
that the new law would lead to stereotyping and produce a negative view of women since their 
appointments to boards would be seen to be due to their gender rather than their competences 
(Casey et al., 2011). To counter resistance from the corporate sector and convince skeptics that the 
quota law should be supported the government shifted its argument away from gender equality 
towards more strict economic reasoning, emphasizing the “business case”: that competitive 
advantages arise from greater female board participation and lead to better corporate governance 
and increased profitability. This re-framing turned out to be successful and the Norwegian 
Parliament passed the law in 2003. It initially required public limited firms to apply the quota on 
a voluntary basis, but after voluntary compliance failed the law became compulsory on 1 January, 
2006, with a two-year transition period backed by a sanction that firms not in compliance by 
January 2008 faced the penalty of liquidation. Notices to comply were issued to 77 delinquent 
firms in January 2008, but by April all public limited firms were in compliance with the law (Ahern 
and Dittmar, 2012). The law increased the average fraction of directorships filled by females from 
11% when it was passed to 42% when it became mandatory (Bøhren and Staubo, 2016). 
An important part of the story about the imposition of the gender quota in Norway is that 
the law applied only to limited liability firms that are classed as public limited firms (known or 
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allmennaksjeselskap or ASA firms). However, Norwegian firms with limited liability can choose 
an alternative organizational form known as AS (aksjeselskap) which is equivalent to a private 
limited firm. ASA firms can make public offering of stock and list on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
whereas AS firms can only raise equity finance from private placements. There are both listed and 
non-listed ASAs, and the quota applies equally to both groups. Prior to the implementation of the 
quota rule in 2008 half of the ASA firms altered their organizational form to AS and so the quota 
law had the unintended consequence of impacting only half of the firms targeted (Bøhren and 
Staubo, 2014). 
Furthermore, as can be observed from Figure 3.1, the female share of board representatives 
in Norwegian public limited companies has not increased to any great extent beyond the statutory 
minimum of 40% since the enactment of the quota law in 2008. In contrast the female share of 
board representatives in private limited companies has hardly changed since 2008 and stood at 
18% in January 2017. It would thus appear that the quota law has not strengthened female board 
representation beyond the catchment area of the law. 
 
Figure 3.1 Share of Female Board Representatives in Public and Private Limited Companies in 
Norway (2005–2017) 
 
Source: Statistics Norway.  
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Furthermore, as Figure 3.2 shows, the share of females holding general manager positions 
in Norway is actually higher in private limited companies than in public limited companies. While 
the share of females holding general manager positions in the latter has increased slightly since 
2008 it still lies below that of the share in private limited companies and there is no sign of this 
gap narrowing. Taken together, these statistics raise questions about the ability of the board gender 
quota law to increase the number of Norwegian women in decision-making positions in economic 
life in general. 
 
Figure 3.2 Share of Female General Managers in Public and Private Limited Companies in 
Norway (2005–2017) 
Source: Statistics Norway.  
Promotion of gender equality by legislation and self-
regulation in Europe 
Against a backdrop of low female representation on boards in EU countries, the Norwegian 
experiment energized the debate on gender quotas. In 2003 the average share of female board 
members was only 9% (Armstrong and Walby, 2012). Several European countries have since 
introduced hard or soft laws to improve the gender balance on company boards. Following the 
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Norwegian lead some have adopted similar legislative actions based on mandatory quotas: Spain 
in 2007; Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands in 2011; and Germany in 2016. These laws 
differ in terms of the rules governing targeted firms, the size of the gender quota, and the severity 
of sanctions for non-compliers. Other countries, such as the UK and Sweden, have adopted a 
voluntary approach that has involved the inclusion of targets in corporate governance codes for 
listed companies. 
The available data indicate that mandatory quotas have succeeded in increasing the 
proportion of women on boards. Apart from Spain, in all countries with mandatory quotas between 
2004 and 2014, the proportion of women on boards increased sharply after the date of the 
introduction of the legislation, and it is well beyond the EU average (Comi et al., 2016). The share 
of women on company boards in the 28 EU countries, and the national measures in place to 
encourage board gender diversity, has been investigated by Jourová (2016) and the results are 
shown in Table 3.1, the data for which are sourced from the European Institute for Gender Equality 
(EIGE) Gender Statistics Database.1 As of April 2016, the average share of women on boards 
across the EU-28 average was 23.3%. In column 2 of Table 3.1, those countries with performance 
above the EU-28 average are shown in bold. 
Despite the progress evident from Table 3.1, the European Commission proposed a 
Directive in 2012 to accelerate progress in improving the gender balance on corporate boards 
within EU Member States (European Commission, 2012b). The Directive sets a quantitative 
objective of a 40% presence of the under-represented gender among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on EU stock exchanges by 2020, and by 2018 in public sector companies. The 
Directive requires companies to issue annual reports on the composition of their boards and for 
sanctions to be imposed in the event of negative evaluations. The European Parliament voted with 
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Table 3.1 Share of women on company boards and national measures in place in European 
Union countries to encourage board gender diversity 
 
Member State Share of women 
on boards(*)  
EU-28 average: 
23.3 % 
Quotas in place Other national measures in place 
Austria 20.1 % Yes: only state-owned 
companies (35 % for 
supervisory boards by 2018). 
Self-regulation: The Corporate Governance 
Code of 2009 recommends representation of 
both genders in appointments to supervisory 
boards. 
Belgium 26.6 % Yes: 33% for executives and 
non- executives in state-owned 
and listed companies-by 2017 
and in listed SMEs-by 2019. 
Self-regulation: The Corporate Governance 
Code of 2009 recommends that the 
composition of a board is determined on the 
basis of gender diversity. 
Bulgaria 17.9% No No 
Croatia 22.2 % No No 
Cyprus 10.9 % No No 
Czech 
Republic 
8.8 % No No 
Denmark 27.0 % No Boards in state-owned companies should ‘as 
far as possible’ have an equal gender balance; 
a man and a woman nominated for every 
vacancy (executives and non-executives). 
From 2013 - obligation to all companies (listed 
and non-listed) to self-regulate and set their 
own targets. A company can be fined if it 
hasn’t set any target figures or hasn’t 
submitted any reporting. 
Estonia 8.2 % No No 
Finland 29.9% No State-owned companies are required to have 
an ‘equitable proportion of women and men’. 
The Corporate Governance Code for listed 
companies contains recommendation that 
‘boards shall consist of both sexes’. 
   (Continued) 
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Quotas in place Other national measures in place 
France 37.1 % Yes: from 2011 - 40 % by 
2017. Applicable to non-
executive directors in large 
listed and non- listed 
companies. 
The AFEP-MEDEF Corporate Code: 
recommendation containing same quotas as in 
the Law of 2011, applicable to all board 
members. 
Germany 27.2 % Yes: from 2016 - 30 % for 
supervisory boards of the listed 
companies that are submitted 
to parity co-determination (the 
roughly 110 biggest listed 
companies). 
Other companies that are either listed or fall 
under parity co-determination have to set 
individual quantitative objectives of women on 
boards with regard to non-executive and 
executive board members and senior managers 
below board level and deadlines to achieve 
them. 
Greece 9.4 % Yes, 33 % - only companies 
fully or partially owned by 
the State. Applicable to all 
board positions (executives 
and non-executives). 
Soft positive action measures in public sector. 
Hungary 11.2 % No Soft positive action measures in public sector. 
Ireland 16.0 % No A policy target of 40 % female participation 
on all state boards and committees. 
Soft positive action measures in public sector 
employment. 
Italy 30.0 % Yes: 33 % by 2015 for listed 
companies and state-owned 
companies. Applicable to  
management boards and  




Latvia 27.7 % No Soft positive action measures in the public 
sector. 
Lithuania 13.0 % No No 
Luxembourg 12.9 % No Soft positive action measures. 
The Corporate Code of 2009 recommends the 
board to have an appropriate representation of 
both genders.  
The rule is applicable to all board members. 
   (Continued) 
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Quotas in place Other national measures in place 
Malta 5.0% No No 
Netherlands 28.1 % Target of 30 % in the 
executive boards and 
supervisory boards of large 
companies - “comply or 
explain” mechanism, no 
sanctions. Measure to expire 
in 2016. 
Self-regulation: diversity clauses in the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code of 2009, 
applicable to both executives and non-
executives. Voluntary Charter with targets for 
more women in management. 
Poland 19.9% No The executive ordinance of Minister of State 
Treasury obliges state-owned companies to 
‘choose adequately prepared members of 
supervisory boards, taking into account the 
balanced participation of women and men’. 
The Code of good practices attached to that 
ordinance establishes a target of 30% for 2015 
and a priority rule for equally qualified 
women. No sanctions are envisaged. 
Portugal 14.2 % No A government resolution of 2015 encourages 
listed companies to attain 30 % of the under-
represented sex at their administrative bodies 
by 2018.  
Romania 10.1 % No Soft positive action measures in public sector 
employment. 
Slovakia 14.3 % No No 
Slovenia 23.9 % No Regulation on state-owned companies: A 
principle of 40% representation of each sex 
applies to the nomination or appointment of 
government representatives to management 
and supervisory boards of state-owned 
enterprises (executives and non-
executives). No sanctions apply if the 
principle is not respected. 
Spain 20.2 % Yes: 40 % (both executives 
and non-executives) by 2015 
(but no sanctions, thus rather 
a recommendation by 
nature) in state-owned 
companies with 250 or more 
employees. New possible 
models under discussion 
Soft positive action measures in public sector 
employment. 
   (Continued) 
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Quotas in place Other national measures in place 
Sweden 36.1 % No Self-regulation: The Corporate 
Governance Code of 2004 has a voluntary 
goal of parity for listed companies – 
“comply or explain” mechanism. 
United 
Kingdom 
27.1 % No Self-regulation – from 2012 on the basis of 
principles of UK Corporate Governance Code 
(following the Lord Davies’ recommendation). 
The recommended target for listed companies 
in FTSE 100: 25%, by 2015 is applicable to all 
board members. FTSE 350 companies 
recommended setting their own aspirational 
targets to be achieved by 2013 and 2015. 
 
Source:  V. Jourová, Gender balance on corporate boards:  Europe is cracking the glass ceiling, European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Fact Sheet, July 2016.  
 
Note: * Performances above the EU average are in bold 
 
Despite a broad consensus across the EU in favour of measures to improve the gender 
balance on company boards, some Member States would prefer either national measures or non-
binding measures at EU level. They take the view that the proposal does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, which holds that the EU may only intervene if it is able to act more 
effectively than EU countries at their respective national or local levels. At the Employment and 
Social Policy Council meeting in June 2015, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, 
Slovakia, the Netherlands and the UK expressed reservations regarding the Commission’s 
proposal and formed a blocking minority. In March 2017, in a resolution on equality between 
women and men in the EU in 2014–2015, the European Parliament urged the Council for a swift 
adoption of the Directive. As of January 2018 no agreement had been reached on its adoption 
(European Parliament, 2018). 
The promotion of gender equality in Europe using quotas 
We now turn our attention to research on the promotion of gender equality and the introduction of 
gender quotas in Europe. We focus on studies of the impact of the mandatory gender quota law in 
Norway. The introduction of this law provides a “natural experiment” that allows researchers to 
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examine the impact of female directors on firm performance free from the problem of endogeneity 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Despite this, no clear conclusion has emerged from the studies 
that examine the effect of the law on firm performance  (Ferreira, 2015). 
Before it was introduced, Norwegian firms affected by the law decided how many women 
to hire as directors and so the fraction of female directors was endogenous (internally specified by 
firms). Researchers could not conclude with certainty whether firms that performed well did do 
because of the proportion of women on their boards, or whether firms that performed well were 
able to then hire more female directors. To determine causality the proportion of female directors 
needs to be exogenously determined, meaning that it must be specified the same way for all firms. 
What the Norwegian gender quota law did was to force all publicly listed firms to have 40% of 
their board seats occupied by women and so the proportion of female directors became an 
exogenously determined variable (decided by forces external to firms) and thus free from the 
endogeneity problem. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) employ an event study method to examine the immediate stock 
market reaction to the first report of the quota in the Verdens Gang newspaper on 22 February 
2002. As the announcement affected all public limited liability firms they calculate industry-
adjusted abnormal returns by subtracting the average return of US firms in the same industry as 
firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the five days surrounding the announcement. Data for 
US rather than Scandinavian industry returns are used on the grounds that global investors were 
unlikely to anticipate that the law would directly affect US firms, whereas they may have 
anticipated that similar laws would be passed in other Scandinavian countries. The authors find 
significant negative abnormal returns around the announcement date, and these are significantly 
larger for firms with no women on the board (−3.54%) compared to firms with at least one woman 
on the board (−0.02%). In contrast to these findings, another event study by Nygaard (2011) finds 
a significantly positive stock market reaction, but in this case the date chosen is when the quota 
was mandated by the Norwegian Parliament and liquidation was established as the penalty for 
noncompliance, on 9 December 2005. 
The difference in the results of these two studies is partly due to what Ferreira (2015) calls 
the “timing problem” as the exact date of the “quota shock” is subject to interpretation. The gender 
quota was first discussed in 1999, the intention of the government to introduce a law was revealed 
in 2002, a law proposing the 40% quota was passed in 2003 without a penalty for noncompliance, 
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in 2005 liquidation was established as the penalty for noncompliance, with firms given two years 
to adjust, and full compliance was only achieved in 2008. There is thus a great deal of freedom to 
define the shock: is it when the Norwegian government first announced that it planned to legislate 
(Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) or is it when the Norwegian Parliament made clear that it was serious 
in its intent by establishing liquidation as the penalty for noncompliance (Nygaard, 2011)? 
Ultimately, this is a matter of judgement. Another reason for the different event study results is the 
absence of a natural control group against which to compare firms (Ferreira, 2015). Normally stock 
returns of firms affected by an event are compared to some measure of the market average, but 
because the quota law applies to all Norwegian listed firms there is no obvious comparator. While 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) use the returns of US firms in the same industry, Nygaard (2011) uses 
the returns on firms that comprise the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index. 
In addition to examining the stock market reaction to the quota law, researchers have also 
examined its longer-term financial impact. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) focus on the market-based 
performance measure Tobin’s Q rather than accounting-based measures, such as ROA, because 
the adoption by Norwegian firms of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) during the 
transition period of the quota makes accounting performance measures less reliable. They find that 
the value of Tobin’s Q in 2007 through 2009 was substantially lower than in 2003 for those firms 
most impacted by the quota. They also investigate how the quota impacted the characteristics of 
boards of directors and find that the new female directors were substantially different from retained 
male directors: they had significantly less CEO experience, were younger, more highly educated, 
and more likely to be employed as non-executive managers. They also found that board size did 
not change as a result of the quota. Thus, rather than meet the quota by simply adding new female 
directors, firms maintained the size of the board at the cost of replacing male directors. 
As noted earlier, a major side-effect of the introduction of the mandatory quota law was 
that its effect could be avoided by firms altering their form of legal organization from public 
limited to private limited (Bøhren and Staubo, 2014). Another means of avoiding the law was to 
incorporate in another country or be acquired by a private or foreign firm. Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) provide evidence that both changes occurred following the introduction of the law. Overall 
the number of public limited firms in Norway in 2009 was less than 70% of the number in 2001 
while the number of private limited firms (not affected by the quota) increased by just over 30%. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) also find a strong negative relationship between the probability of 
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delisting after the quota is passed and the number of women on the board before the quota is 
passed, after controlling for firm size, risky investments and industry effects. 
A significant decline in financial performance following the introduction of the quota law 
is also detected by Matsa and Miller (2013). They find that the ratio of operating profits to assets 
among affected firms decreased from 2003 to 2009 by about 4% compared with a matched sample 
of unlisted firms in Norway, and listed and unlisted firms in other Nordic countries. They attribute 
this deterioration to differences in employment policies: firms affected by the quota laid off fewer 
employees, causing an increase in relative labour costs and a reduction in short-run profits. The 
strongest effects were found among firms that were required to add the most women in order to 
comply with the law. The reduced layoffs are not attributable to changes in board strategy as boards 
affected and unaffected by the quota were equally willing to initiate mergers, acquisitions and joint 
ventures. They also find no evidence that the impact of the gender quota was driven by changes in 
board member characteristics other than gender, such as age or experience. Although the new 
female directors were younger on average, they replaced younger men and did not decrease the 
average age of the boards. 
Research into the financial performance consequences of the gender quota law is also 
undertaken by Dale-Olsen et al. (2013). They find that the change in the ROA of non-financial 
public limited companies affected by the law is negligible compared to that of private limited 
companies unaffected by the law over the period from 2003 to 2007. They also find that the reform 
had no significant impact on the operating revenues or on the operating costs of the affected firms, 
and that although these firms accumulated more capital after the reform, either by raising debt or 
equity, this is more likely due to a shortage of capital on financial markets as the financial crisis 
approached rather than a greater appetite for risk by the additional female board members. 
Bøhren and Staubo (2016) also examine the impact of the gender quota law on the financial 
performance of listed and non-listed Norwegian firms. They compare ROA in 2003, when the 
gender law was passed by the Norwegian Parliament, to the average ROA in the subsequent period 
from 2004 until 2008, when the law became mandatory. They find that firms that needed to hire 
more female directors (as they had fewer women on the board prior to the quota) have significantly 
lower ROA, while no such relationship is found for the unexposed, non-listed firms. They also 
measure board independence, defined as the fraction of outside directors, and find that this 
increased significantly, which they attribute to independence being a much more common 
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characteristic among female director candidates than among males. Bøhren and Staubo (2016) 
argue that there is a trade-off between the value of monitoring provided by independent directors 
and the value of advice provided by inside directors and that board quality declined when the 
introduction of the mandatory quota tipped boardroom independence above its optimal level. It is 
also possible that board independence increased because of the influence of the Norwegian 
corporate governance code, which was introduced two years before the gender quota law became 
mandatory in 2008 and which recommends that half of the board members are independent. 
However, while the gender quota law applies to both listed and non-listed firms, the code applies 
only to listed firms, and Bøhren and Staubo (2016) find the same upward shift in independence 
regardless of listing status. Thus, they conclude that increased independence is due to the gender 
quota law rather than the corporate governance code. 
The Norwegian approach to implementing gender quotas has not been repeated in other 
countries. In Germany a law requiring that women hold 30% of supervisory board seats of the top 
100 or so publicly traded companies went into effect in January 2016. A March 2016 study from 
the Hans Böckler Foundation reports that only about 22% of supervisory board seats at Germany’s 
top companies were occupied by women (Weckes, 2016). Although the share of women in top 
board positions doubled over a five-year period, the legally mandated quota was not met. This is 
most probably related to the fact that the quota law in Germany has no teeth, unlike quota laws in 
other European countries, such as Norway and France, where companies face fines and other 
sanctions for not complying. It may also be related to negative perceptions of quota-based selection 
policies in Germany, as revealed in an experimental study by Shaughnessy et al. (2016) based on 
recruits from German social networking sites. Their findings show that quota-based selection 
policies negatively influence applicant evaluations of an organization and ultimately their decision 
to pursue employment. Nevertheless, the identification of non-compliant companies is having 
some impact as German companies wish to avoid being viewed as a negative example, which 
suggests that the number of compliant companies is likely to rise over time (Weckes, 2016). 
Most studies of the impact of gender diversity initiatives focus on a single country, but 
there is some evidence from multi-country studies. Casey et al. (2011) compare the hard and soft 
policies used, respectively, by Norway and New Zealand to achieve board gender equality using 
qualitative data collected between 2004 and 2005 on women’s experiences of governance 
participation. Their study involved interviews with 35 women: 18 in Norway and 17 in New 
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Zealand. They find evidence of a perception in Norway that some women were ‘quota-filling’ and 
lacked competence in a forced compliance situation, while in New Zealand there is evidence of a 
view that the voluntary approach enabled some boards to insulate themselves entirely from gender 
equality issues. Labelle et al. (2015) use a multi-country research design to examine how gender 
diversity is related to firm performance in countries that apply an “enabling approach” based on 
regulation and those that use a “voluntary approach” where there is no enforcement mechanism. 
They exclude Norway as the only country using what they term a “coercive approach” based on 
affirmative action. Their sample comprises 719 firms from 17 countries at the beginning of 2009 
and 2011. Nine countries are classified as adopting a voluntary approach in 2009 (Canada, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, the UK and the US) while eight countries are 
classified as adopting an enabling approach (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and Sweden). As changes to corporate governance codes promoting 
gender diversity came into effect by 2011 in France, Germany, the UK and the US, these countries 
shifted to the group following a regulatory approach. The authors find that gender diversity is 
positively related to firm performance, measured by ROA, in countries using the voluntary 
approach, but negatively related in countries adopting the regulatory approach. While their 
research can be criticized for using an unbalanced panel of data over a limited time period, their 
result is nevertheless in line with the intuition that an accelerated increase in demand for more 
female directors in countries following the regulatory approach can result in firms appointing less 
experienced women to the board. 
The voluntary approach to the promotion of gender equality 
in Europe 
Across many EU countries a range of voluntary initiatives have been developed to address under-
representation of women at board level. National corporate governance codes encourage, to 
varying degrees, gender diversity on company boards, and in some countries these are 
complementary to quotas (see Table 3.1). 
The UK has adopted a purely voluntary approach to the promotion of gender equality on 
company boards following the recommendation of an independent review by Lord Davies of 
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Abersoch into how obstacles to the participation of women on boards could be removed (Davies, 
2011). The Davies Report Women on Boards recommended that the UK’s comply-or-explain 
corporate governance code be amended to require listed companies to establish boardroom 
diversity policies, and this was duly implemented the following year in a revised version of The 
UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). It also set a target of 25% 
female representation on the boards of FTSE 100 listed companies by 2015. Smaller companies 
comprising the FTSE 250 index were recommended to set their own aspirational targets. In a 
review of progress four years later, Lord Davies was able to report that the target for FTSE 100 
companies had been met, with female representation more than doubling since 2011 to stand at 
26.1% (Davies, 2015). The FTSE 250 firms started their journey from a lower base and more than 
doubled female representation on their boards: in 2011 only 17 companies had 25% or more 
women on their boards compared to 79 companies by 2015. He also notes there were no all-male 
boards in the FTSE 100 in 2015, compared with 21 in 2011, and characterizes the UK as “a leader 
and role model on the international stage for having made such good progress under an entirely 
voluntary regime” (Davies, 2015: 10). He also notes that the UK was sixth in Europe in terms of 
female boardroom representation, behind Norway, Sweden, France, Finland and Belgium, all of 
which had largely introduced legislative quota regimes. 
Acknowledging the need to maintain momentum, the UK government set up another 
independent review on female representation at board level with a remit to continue improving the 
proportion of women on the boards of FTSE 350 companies, and also to improve their 
representation below board level in the senior layers of management. Chaired by Sir Philip 
Hampton, with Dame Helen Alexander as deputy chair, the Hampton-Alexander Review set a new 
target of 33% female representation on boards of FTSE 100 companies by 2020, with the same 
voluntary target for FTSE 350 companies (Hampton and Alexander, 2016). It also set a target of 
33% female representation by 2020 for board executive committees of FTSE 100 companies and 
for those who directly report to these executive committees. In targeting board executive 
committees and the layers beneath the Board, the Hampton-Alexander Review is setting a more 
ambitious agenda that will require companies to increase reporting of data about their executive 
pipeline that has hitherto not been subject to disclosure requirements. Whether the Hampton-
Alexander Review targets can be met by 2020 and whether momentum for increased female 
representation can be sustained more generally has arguably been affected by the UK decision to 
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exit the EU following the referendum in 2016. A company chairman quoted anonymously by 
Davies states that his report encouraged businesses to work together to avoid quotas being imposed 
by Europe. It is thus possible that UK businesses may feel less inclined to meet targets in a post-
Brexit environment. That said, another company chairman was quoted by Davies (2015: 14) saying 
that  
nobody wants to be left out, so once it becomes a direction of travel then people climb on 
board because they don’t want to appear to be the odd ones out. The more people that did 
it, the more people saw that actually the boardroom dynamics improved.  
It is therefore feasible that the culture of change has become embedded and that achievement of 
targets will be unaffected by Brexit. 
Some EU countries chose to promote greater female board representation using charters to 
which companies can sign up. In the Netherlands, the charter Talent to the Top requires companies 
to establish quantitative goals for the representation of women in senior management positions, to 
measure their achievements against these goals and to report annually to a monitoring committee 
each year on the progress they have made. The 110 largest Dutch companies signed the charter, 
including many large household names such as Shell, Phillips, Heineken, Reed Elsevier and 
Unilever (Branson, 2012). By 2010 the share of women in senior positions in companies that 
signed the charter in 2008 and 2009 had grown by 7.5% and, overall, 72% of companies recorded 
an increase over this period (European Commission, 2012a).  
In Denmark, a similar pledge initiative was developed in 2008 by the Danish Ministry of 
Gender Equality in the form of a Charter for More Women in Management. No sanctions were 
included in the Charter and it was criticized for a lack of evident results (Agustín and Siim, 2015). 
It was followed in 2010 by another initiative called Operation Chain Reaction – Recommendation 
for more women on supervisory board which encouraged companies to recruit more female 
managers to the supervisory boards of Danish limited liability companies. By 2012, only 55 
companies had adopted Operation Chain Reaction and so the Danish Parliament legislated in 2013 
to require companies to set target figures and prepare a policy if either gender represents less than 
40%. Although the new rules are flexible in the sense that no specific quotas are set, given that 
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companies are subject to a reporting duty it can be argued that the rules introduce a form of quota 
through the back door. 
Conclusion 
Most European countries that have considered gender balance regulation at board level have opted 
for a voluntary rather than a mandatory approach, while some have adopted a hybrid approach that 
combines self-regulation alongside quotas. Norway provides the clearest example of the 
mandatory approach with a quota backed by sanctions while the UK best exemplifies the self-
regulation route based on the comply-or-explain principle. The experience of the UK suggests that 
substantial progress can be made using a voluntary approach. Against the backdrop of the 
European Commission’s proposed Directive that sets a 40% board seat target, the experience of 
Norway provides the clearest example of what might lie ahead. The ability of some Norwegian 
companies to evade the quota, alongside evidence that gender diversity did not improve among 
those Norwegian companies not subject to the quota, suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach is 
not necessarily the best approach to follow. 
Notes 
1. The European Institute for Gender Equality, an EU Agency located in Vilnius, Lithuania, is 
the host of the Gender Statistics Database. 
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